

Mr. John F. Doherty, Chairman
Interdepartmental Committee on Internal Security
Department of Justice
Washington, D. C.

Dear Mr. Doherty:

25X1 The United States Intelligence Board has been disturbed by the existence of differing security procedures followed by departments and agencies within the U. S. intelligence community in their relations with foreign liaison [redacted] personnel. The Security Committee of USIB recently completed a study of this problem and prepared a policy statement which USIB has approved and issued to its members. A copy of that policy statement which establishes uniform security processing procedures applicable to foreign liaison [redacted] representatives in the intelligence field is enclosed for your information.

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In studying this problem, it soon became apparent that of the thousands of foreign governmental representatives in the United States, only a small fraction of them are in liaison with the intelligence community, and it is only in the area of the protection of intelligence that USIB may regulate. The large numbers of other foreign representatives, whether they attend military service schools or conduct liaison with departments or agencies on non-intelligence matters, are beyond the purview of USIB, although these same foreign representatives may also be recipients of classified U. S. information of a non-intelligence nature, and hence warrant security concern.

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The enclosed USIB policy statement is forwarded in the belief that the members of your Committee may wish to consider the application of similar measures for the security processing of those foreign representatives who have access to U. S. classified information outside the intelligence field.

Richard Helms
Director of Central Intelligence

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